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Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism
Company of Puerto Rico: The End
of the Beginning
by P. CAMERON DEVORE*
Since the Supreme Court decided the Posadas' case on July
1, 1986, it has been a time of turbulence for commercial speech
- the first amendment doctrine protecting advertising. The
hard question remains whether Posadas signals the demise of
commercial speech as a separate first amendment category, or
whether the case can be dismissed as an aberration whose ex-
otic facts are distinguishable from almost any other imaginable
type of advertising ban. Because commercial speech continues
to hang in the balance, reevaluation of Posadas, one year later,
is in order.
You will recall that Posadas upheld the constitutionality of a
porous and strangely administered Puerto Rico statute prohib-
iting casino gambling advertising aimed at residents of Puerto
Rico. Because almost every possible sort of gambling is legal in
Puerto Rico, the case presented for the first time the ultimate
regulatory question of whether - absent false or misleading
content - advertising of an entirely legal product or service
could be banned under the first amendment as applied by the
Central Hudson2 four-part test. Justice Rehnquist - long hos-
tile to the commercial speech doctrine - rounded up a five-
four majority with Justices Burger, Powell, O'Connor and
White to uphold the statute. Justices Brennan and Stevens
wrote sharp dissents, each in turn joined by Justices Marshall
and Blackmun.
Aggressive state and federal regulators greeted Posadas as
removing their first amendment shackles. This was dramati-
cally illustrated in the second round of bitter debate last spring
* Partner, Davis Wright & Jones, Seattle, Washington. Remarks to Communi-
cations Law 1987 Practising Law Institute, New York City, Nov. 12, 1987. Footnotes
have been added by the editors.
1. Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986).
2. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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and summer over Representative Synar's H.R. 1272, the bill
banning all forms of tobacco advertising. Sharply differing in-
terpretations of Posadas have been a pivotal issue in the debate.
To ban proponents, Posadas is the universal panacea, legitimiz-
ing any legislation aimed at reducing demand for a harmful
product, even though sale of the product itself is completely
legal. Opponents described Posadas as distinguishable on its
facts, conceptually inconsistent with Central Hudson - whose
,four-part test would arguably be flunked cold by the Synar bill.
The debate was at times acrimonious, and the interpretations of
Posadas irreconcilable.
One year plus after Posadas, it continues to be obvious to me
that the opponents have the better first amendment argu-
ments. The case simply cannot be squared with Central
Hudson.
If you cut Posadas free from its facts and construe it broadly
as a rewriting of the four-part Central Hudson test, you really
end up with no test at all. Let's, quickly run through the four-
part test as applied in Posadas to illustrate the point.
First, the Court quickly passed through the initial test: casino
gambling is legal in Puerto Rico and its advertisement is not
misleading - although Justice Rehnquist established a beach-
head even at this point by observing that the casino ads were
not misleading only "in the abstract."
Second, as for a substantial state interest, the Court picked
up the assertion by the Puerto Rico trial judge that casino gam-
bling by residents could harm their "health, safety and wel-
fare" - a recognizable interest but one never expressed in 1948
when the law was enacted. In effect, the simple existence of
the law was allowed to create a presumption of a legitimate and
substantial legislative purpose. The internal inconsistencies in
the law and with the otherwise pro-gambling laws of Puerto
Rico, were not addressed. Given the inconsistencies and idio-
syncrasies, Justice Brennan could discover no interest substan-
tial enough to meet what all four dissenters saw as the state's
first amendment burden. Justice Stevens simply observed that
the law is "grotesquely flawed."
Third, as to whether the legislation directly advanced a gov-
ernmental interest in reducing resident casino gambling - the
Court again simply assumed this to be the case. There was ab-
solutely no evidence before the Puerto Rico trial court of such
direct advancement and none was required by the Supreme
[Vol. 10:579
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Court. Once again the effect is to create a presumption of di-
rect advancement from the fact that the legislature had seen fit
to enact the statute and, amazingly, by the fact that advertisers
had challenged it. A first amendment burden of proof requir-
ing the state to show deterrence of crime or corruption was not
even considered by the majority. The Court's logic here is
Kafkaesque - you lose this argument because you have chal-
lenged the law; if the ban had not reduced casino gambling, you
would not have sued!
Finally, as to the fourth and normally toughest Central Hud-
son test, the Court had no trouble finding the law no more ex-
tensive than necessary because of its limitation to advertising
aimed at residents. As for the classic first amendment argu-
ment that counter-speech is better than suppression, Justice
Rehnquist observed that was a perfectly permissible choice for
the legislature to make. (So much for speech as the primary
value!) Justice Brennan was scornful of the assumption that
Puerto Rico had succeeded sub silentio in showing that any
protected interest could not be advanced by less intrusive regu-
lation. He delivered a brief but classic first amendment lecture
about the state's heavy burden in justifying speech regulation
to prove that more limited means are insufficient, leaving to
the courts their proper constitutional role of deciding under the
first amendment whether the state's burden has been
sustained.
Given the Court's repeated citation of Central Hudson it is
hard not to join the dissenters' incredulity at the word games of
the opinion. The contrasting approaches are, of course, exem-
plified by Justice Rehnquist's aside that it would be a "strange
constitutional doctrine" which would forbid a legislature to
pass laws dampening demand for a product when it has the
power to ban the product itself,' and by Justice Brennan's tart
identification of that "strange doctrine" as the one "called the
First Amendment.
'4
The Posadas majority's insensitivity to established free
speech analysis is most strikingly shown by its two key assump-
tions, "if you can ban conduct, you can ban speech about it,"
5
and "if you challenge the law, you simply prove that the law is
3. 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2979.
4. Id. at 2984.
5. Id. at 2979-80.
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'directly advancing' what it was designed to do."'6
Justice Rehnquist finally got his heart's desire about com-
mercial speech, but it is hard not to feel real concern about the
shifts in position of the judges who joined - especially Justice
Powell, the author of Central Hudson, and Justice White, the
author of Zauderer.7
So is Posadas simply one of the most striking examples of the
power of the Supreme Court - what the Lord giveth, the Lord
can take away? For all of you here who spend large parts of
your practice tending the doctrinal development of the first
amendment, the case continues to be one of the major "down-
ers" of the Burger/Rehnquist era.
Nineteen-eighty-seven did not bring us the next major test of
the commercial speech doctrine - although as I will discuss in
a moment, the San Francisco Arts & Athletics case, decided on
June 25, 1987, shows how commercial speech precedents can
spill over and be used uncritically to support regulation of pro-
tected non-commercial speech.
But first, let's briefly revisit the tobacco ban controversy. I
will also touch on the case in which R. J. Reynolds is defending
its right to publish political advertising about cigarette smoking
issues in the face of an intense and even emotional attack by
FTC staff and anti-smoking partisans. The case supplied one of
the few recent bright spots in commercial speech - but only
because an FTC administrative law judge recognized in 1986
the fact that the Reynolds' commentary was not commercial
speech, and thus not susceptible to FTC scrutiny and
regulation.
In Congress, hearings were held in July and August 1987 on
the Synar bill. On behalf of the proponents, Representative
Waxman, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, argued that Posadas
made it "perfectly clear that the constitutionality of an ad ban
is no longer in question."
Earlier in the year, a major war had been fought at the
American Bar Association (ABA) mid-year meeting in New
Orleans, with voice vote rejection of a proposal that the ABA
support the tobacco ad ban. A galaxy of constitutional scholars
6. Id. at 2976.
7. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626 (1985).
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was ranged on both sides. The ABA vote deprived ban propo-
nents of a major argument that America's lawyers collectively
construed Posadas as legitimizing the ban. The American
Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) and the ACLU,
among others, testified in Congress in support of first amend-
ment protection for tobacco ads. ANPA distinguished Posadas,
describing the Puerto Rico legislation as a "narrow ban" which
effectively permitted an immense amount of advertising about
casino gambling, both in and outside Puerto Rico, so long as it
was not aimed directly at the citizens. It pointed out that the
Court would necessarily have less trouble with prohibition of
gambling advertising - as opposed to tobacco advertising - be-
cause casino gambling is illegal in all but three states, while
tobacco products are universally legally sold and the chance of
Congress' outlawing their sale is remote. ANPA also stressed
the "unique" Puerto Rico cultural situation, alluded to by the
Court in its opinion, and concluded that Central Hudson indeed
survives Posadas. The ACLU made the intriguing argument
that the Puerto Rico statute had improperly slipped through
the first amendment as a mere time, place or manner
regulation.
The fight over tobacco advertising is likely not over -
although it has subsided in the 100th Congress, due in no small
part to the strong first amendment opposition to the bill.
Applying "classic" commercial speech analysis to Represen-
tative Synar's text, there is an obvious question as to whether
- given the immense structure of laws subsidizing and favor-
ing the tobacco industry - the governmental interest in ban-
ning advertising meets the second or "substantiality" test under
Central Hudson. Given the broad possibility of counter-speech
and other less intrusive regulations, it is also highly questiona-
ble under "classic" analysis whether the proposed bill is not
broader than necessary. Also, as to whether "direct advance-
ment" would occur, advertising industry spokesmen submitted
evidence that bans on advertising in other countries have had
no apparent effect on tobacco consumption, and that tobacco
advertising does not convert non-smokers and is important al-
most entirely for brand switching.
Of course, a first amendment challenge to a tobacco advertis-
ing ban would confront the Supreme Court with a real test of
the continuing reach of the commercial speech doctrine. Given
the intense public debate, the conflicting evidence, and the like-
1988]
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lihood that Congress would be subjected to a heavier burden of
justification than was the Puerto Rico legislature in Posadas, I
find it hard to believe that the tobacco ban would withstand
first amendment scrutiny - unless the court overturned not
just Central Hudson, but Virginia Pharmacy," and the other
key precedents. However disquieting from the perspective of
first amendment.consistency, I suspect the tobacco case would
be merely one more example of the continuing rise and fall of
cases on the commercial speech rollercoaster.
Meanwhile, what does the 1987 San Francisco Arts case9 tell
us about commercial speech and the general status of the first
amendment in the Rehnquist court? The case seems to show
how the attitudes of the Justices reflected in Posadas can blur
the edges of first amendment analysis on both commercial
speech and fully protected speech. The decision did not get
much media coverage. Trademark law usually is a somewhat
peripheral field for media lawyers. Congress granted trade-
mark rights beyond normal Lanham Act trademark protection
to the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), a private
nonprofit corporation, strongly protecting the word
"Olympic."1 The Supreme Court held that this protection did
not violate the first amendment - even though statutory pro-
tection goes beyond commercial uses to promotional and, ar-
guably, political speech. The case was brought by San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, a nonprofit group attempting to
promote a "Gay Olympic Games" - a use which the USOC suc-
ceeded in having enjoined by the district court and affirmed by
the Ninth Circuit.
Justice Powell wrote the opinion, for Justices Rehnquist,
White, Stevens and Scalia. Justices Brennan and Marshall dis-
sented on first amendment grounds, and also on equal protec-
tion grounds. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor concurred in
the majority's first amendment analysis, but joined in the dis-
senters' equal protection analysis.
In another result-oriented opinion, the Court slip-slides
around both commercial speech and political speech prece-
dents. As for commercial speech, if the Olympic statute were
8. Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
9. San Francisco Arts and Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971
(1987).
10. 36 U.S.C. § 380.
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limited to regulating confusing commercial uses of the word, it
would likely pass muster under Central Hudson. However, be-
cause the Court construes the Act not to require proof of confu-
sion, it goes beyond the trademark rationale. The Court cites
Central Hudson to say that a restriction on nonmisleading com-
mercial speech may be justified, but then cites as the only justi-
fication Congress' "great interest" in encouraging the financial
viability of the USOC, which it characterizes in one gulp as sub-
stantial, directly advanced, and the restriction no more exten-
sive than necessary.1'
As for non-commercial speech, the Court fuzzes the distinc-
tion, stating that the Act applies "primarily" to commercial
speech - and thus, that the overbreadth doctrine applied by
Justice Brennan in dissent to the Act's obvious non-commercial
applications, does not apply. The Court says there is "no reason
in the record to believe that the Act will be interpreted or ap-
plied to infringe significantly on non-commercial subjects.' 12
All in all, this is a slippery and troublesome analysis. The
Court broadly defines commercial speech as "strictly business"
speech - as opposed to speech specifically limited to proposing
a commercial transaction. As we all worried before Green-
moss13 was decided, "business" is not a constitutionally viable
watershed between commercial speech and fully protected
speech, and sweeps in far too much of the latter. As in Posadas,
the Court simply repeats the Central Hudson litany without
analysis, citing both Posadas and Central Hudson.
Justice Brennan has no problem in finding governmental ac-
tion, and thus a violation of equal protection. Focusing on the
apparent non-commercial speech applications of the statute, he
applies classic first amendment overbreadth analysis to statu-
tory prohibition of use of "Olympic" to "promote any theatrical
exhibition, athletic performance, or competition.' 1 4 He charac-
terizes the Court's "justifications of these infringements of
First Amerdment rights" as "flimsy."' 5 He skewers the Court's
citation of United States v. O'Brien16 to justify the regulation,
and, applying Central Hudson, cannot see any governmental
11. 107 S. Ct. at 2981 n.15.
12. Id. at 2981 (emphasis added).
13. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
14. 107 S. Ct. at 2993 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 2994 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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purpose that would not be effectively protected by giving the
USOC a "strictly commercial trademark" which would be
clearly limited to preventing confusing commercial uses. In
short, he sees the Court's analysis as flawed under political
speech cases, and under Central Hudson because its "restric-
tions on First Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary
to further a substantial state interest.'
17
I suppose we can try to make ourselves feel better by viewing
San Francisco Arts, like Posadas, as another minor episode in
the great scheme of first amendment analysis. However, the
storm signals are deeply troubling. One clearly tenable - yet
hopefully temporary - conclusion is that a majority of the
Court has all but abandoned the attempt to provide reasoned
guidance in application of commercial speech doctrine. Central
Hudson - again hopefully momentarily - is reduced to a four-
part word game to be played through before reaching the pre-
determined result. In any case, the contrast to the Bigelow 8-
through-Zauderer line of commercial speech cases is dramatic.
After that somewhat pessimistic overview lets look quickly
at major commercial speech developments during the year, and
particularly at important pending cases:
1. What Is - and Isn't - Commercial Speech. In R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. 9 a 1986 Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), administrative judge decision which I referred to ear-
lier, Reynolds successfully argued that its editorial ad, "Of Cig-
arettes & Science," an attack on the methodology of a
government study linking cigarettes with heart disease, was
fully protected political speech and not commercial speech.
The distinction is more than academic. The FTC simply has no
jurisdiction over political speech.
The whole Federal Trade Commission heard argument in
March, and has not yet announced a decision. The administra-
tive law judge's persuasive opinion was subjected to hot criti-
cism by FTC staff and various anti-smoking groups. ,We did an
amicus brief for ANPA, supporting full first amendment pro-
tection of the ad copy. Given the increasingly sharp first
amendment distinctions between fully protected speech and
commercial speech, defining - and holding - the borderline is
17. 107 S. Ct. at 2981.
18. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
19. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 51 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 219
(Aug. 6, 1986).
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critical. San Francisco Arts illustrates the problems occurring
when the line is blurred.
2. How Much Advertising Law Enforcement Can Be Im-
posed on the Media? It has always been seductive to federal,
state and local regulators to impose on the media the job of
screening illegal ads. Newspaper classifieds have been the
usual target. Starting with Pittsburgh Press,20 a line of cases has
upheld the imposition of penalties on the media for knowingly
aiding and abetting, for example, discriminatory real estate or
employment ads. The first amendment has not been a viable
shield to the media in these situations. Now, at last, a federal
district court in Florida has blown the whistle. At issue was a
fairly typical licensed contractor regulatory scheme, requiring
the media to print contractor registration numbers in contrac-
tor ads, or in the alternative to obtain a certificate from the
contractor as to why a number is not needed. The case is News
& Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Board of County Commissioners.2 '
The court distinguishes Pittsburgh Press as a case involving
the newspaper's own sexually discriminatory help wanted ad-
vertising layout. The court here strikes down the ordinance
under the first amendment, citing Arkansas Writers Project v.
Ragland,22 the 1987 discriminatory tax case. The court says
that the press may not be singled out to bear special burdens,
even where there is no evidence of an "improper [state] censo-
rial motive. '23 The court holds that the financial and editorial
burdens of complying with the ordinance are an impermissible
threat "to the institutional viability of the press as a whole. '24
This is a great citation for newspapers which are arm-wres-
tling with government regulators who assert press exposure to
liability under similar statutes, and under other "aiding and
abetting" regulatory schemes.
3. Publisher Tort Liability. Courts have been extremely re-
luctant to impose liability on the media for damages alleged to
flow from false and misleading ad copy, unless the media spe-
cifically prepared the incorrect copy or vouched for the prod-
uct, a la the Good Housekeeping "Seal of Approval." Dow
20. Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973).
21. 14 MEDIA L. RPTR. 1477 (BNA) (S.D. Fla. 1987).
22. 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987).
23. 14 MEDIA L. RPTR. at 1482.
24. Id. at 1483.
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Jones won a good decision in the Ohio Supreme Court last year
in Gutter v. Dow Jones,25 concerning incorrect securities infor-
mation in the Wall Street Journal. The Journal won again in a
Louisiana Federal District Court decision, Pittman v. Dow
Jones.26 Suffice it to say that the court concludes that lesser
first amendment protection of commercial speech does not un-
dercut the rule that "the First Amendment strongly counsels
against... [this] kind of liability .... Newspapers are instru-
ments of the free flow of information, commercial and other-
wise, in our society.
27
Contra, if you will pardon the expression, is Norwood v. Sol-
dier of Fortune Magazine, 28 a 1987 decision of a Federal District
Court in Arkansas denying a first amendment summary judg-
ment to the magazine which had run ads from mercenaries, one
of whom allegedly had been hired to kill a member of the plain-
tiff's family. The decision simply does not cite governing law
and, in any event, I suspect that you might find Soldier of For-
tune distinguishable from the Wall Street Journal.29
4. The Attack on the Postal Lottery Laws. Let me close by
telling you the latest developments in the two-pronged congres-
sional and first amendment attack on the postal lottery laws.
For roughly 100 years, it has been a crime to distribute by mail
any matter which might in the opinion of the postal authorities
promote gambling or games of chance. For daily metropolitan
newspapers, whose mail circulation may be less than one per-
cent of their total daily circulation, the physical impossibility of
replating the paper to exclude ads about legal gambling activi-
ties from the mail portion of the press run means that such ads
are not run at all, even in home-delivered newspapers and
those sold on the streets. The tip of the tail wags the dog, and
the public is deprived of information about these perfectly legal
activities. The key word is "legal." As opposed to the casino
gambling at issue in Posadas - legal in only three states -
other common forms of gambling have been legalized in virtu-
ally all states. Charitable bingo has been the most commonly
legalized activity - and repeated attempts to advertise it have
25. 490 N.E. 2d 898, 22 Ohio St. 3d 286 (1986).
26. 662 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. La. 1987).
27. Id. at 924.
28. 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
29. Belkin, Magazine is ordered to Pay $9.4 Million for Killer's Ad, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 4, 1988, at 9, col. 1.
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brought newspapers all over the country into confrontation
with the Postal Service. Last year, two cases challenging the
law were commenced, and both are at the summary judgment
stage.
The Aimes 0 case involves a gambling information magazine,
which includes information on activities which are legal in
other nations, but may not be considered so in this country. A
decision on summary judgment has been pending for over a
year. Perhaps a more compelling first amendment case is the
Minnesota Newspapers' suit against the Postal Service.3 1 Sum-
mary judgment was argued to the Federal District Court judge
in Minneapolis on September 18, 1987. Counsel for the Associa-
tion reports that the judge sharply questioned the U. S. Attor-
ney's application of Posadas as modifying Central Hudson. The
judge indicated that he felt that Posadas might be factually dis-
tinguishable. If Central Hudson is indeed applied, the newspa-
pers have made an excellent case that the mail prohibition of
locally legal gambling flunks all of the last three Central Hud-
son tests. Minnesota Newspapers and Aimes, which may or
may not be decided consistently, could provide both the first
post-Posadas indication of where we stand in judicial response
to Posadas, and the next cases which give promise of eventually
confronting the Supreme Court with an issue that may provide
the next major commercial speech ruling. 2 In the meantime,
two bills were filed in the House of Representatives which
would accomplish the same result sought in the court cases.
The summary judgment rulings will no doubt be cited in the
legislative process as well.
In short, while there is still considerable indecision in the
Renquist Court about the status of commercial speech, the doc-
trine is still "alive" in the lower courts. However, Posadas and
San Francisco Arts indicate that there may well be troubled
30. Aimes Publications v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 86-1434 (D.D.C. filed May 23,
1986).
31. Minn. Newspaper Ass'n v. Postmaster General, No. 86-806 (D. Minn. 1986).
32. On Jan. 6, 1988, the Minnesota Federal District Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the postal lottery laws as applied to wrapper advertising. The Postal Service
and the U.S. Department of Justice filed a direct appeal with the United States
Supreme Court, objecting to the District Court's decision striking down the statutory
prohibition as applied to editorial content. The Association has filed a cross-appeal on
the advertising issue. Minn. Newspaper Ass'n, No. 86-806 (D. Minn. 1986) (order
granting summary judgment).
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times ahead - both for commercial speech and for the first
amendment in the Supreme Court.
